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Accidents
Analysis from the White Mountains of
New Hampshire and occasionally elsewhere

I

spread my winter gear across the bed, and it seems too much to
fit back into the pack I’ve drawn it from. A slightly rank scent, a mix of
storage and old use, fills the room; outside, the clear sky and early dark hint
at a first frost.
I change out old batteries, wonder again whether to add in a third headlamp, note also how flimsy my emergency blanket feels, decide to hand wash
the musty hat, resolve to give my sleeping bag a sun bath tomorrow. So many
bits that will fit back into a storage pattern that is familiar too. That’s the zipspot where the thermal warmers are, I think. Better check.
“Bit by bit” sets up as a little soundtrack in my head; I hum, make up lyrics—“snow pit” rhymes with “bit by bit.” That’s how hurt happens, I remind
myself, bit by bit, and then . . . all at once.
There is, of course, a deeper resonance here than my door-closed, I-won’tmake-you-suffer-through-it-verse-making. Many will recognize this brief
exchange from Ernest Hemingway’s The Sun Also Rises:
“How did you go bankrupt?” Bill asked.
“Two ways,” Mike said. “Gradually and then suddenly.”

So much of winter’s joy and hazard is contained in this tiny phrase: bit by
bit can be the snow that animates the season, and it can be the slow steps of
your way into a remote valley. So much joy . . . and a corona of caution: Bring
also the good bits with you.
But then—I remind myself—bit by bit can be the little increments that
get us to a place and time where a whole slope lets go, or a cloud descends,
when everything changes instantly.
—Sandy Stott
Accidents Editor
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A Walk in the Woods
Several people came to the aid of 44-year-old Omar L. when he suffered a
medical emergency on the East Branch Road Trail in Lincoln Woods on the
morning of November 19, 2020. Chris T. (age not reported) reached the White
Mountain National Forest ranger station at 10 a.m., where he reported Omar’s
trouble. The U.S. Forest Service called Lincoln Police, who sent Lincoln Fire
and Rescue and also summoned Linwood Ambulance to the ranger station.
Here, some complication and delay arose. Chris was unsure where he and
Omar had been, and his confused description sent the fire and rescue all-
terrain vehicle up the wrong side of the river on the Lincoln Woods Trail. After
not finding Omar, the rescuers returned to the Lincoln Woods lot and called
New Hampshire Fish and Game; Lt. James Kneeland set about organizing a
search and rescue. Conservation Officer Christopher G. McKee reached the
trailhead at just after 1 p.m., and at around 1:30 he joined other rescuers who,
by that time, had located Omar. McKee spoke with an emergency medical
technician from Lincoln, assessed the situation, and ran back to get Lincoln
Fire and Rescue’s ATV. He drove to the site, and, with volunteers stabilizing
Omar’s litter, drove the ATV slowly to the parking lot, where both the ambulance and Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center personnel were waiting. At
3 p.m. the Dartmouth-Hitchcock Advanced Response Team helicopter took
off for the medical center. Omar was reported to be “improved” the next day.
Comment: This relatively simple, albeit serious and hurried, rescue from
a nearby trail has a backstory that serves also as comment. At the outset of
their hoped-for “loop walk” on the morning of November 18, Omar and
Chris must have noticed a sharp cold that presaged winter. The day averaged
20 degrees below normal atop Mount Washington, and, although Lincoln
Woods is much lower, it was below freezing there, and snow grains punctuated the air. Aside from aiming for a loop, the pair didn’t have other intent;
nor did they have equipment, or food, or a map.
CO McKee, who interviewed Chris trying to unravel the pair’s travels,
figured out that they had started up the east side of the East Branch of the
Pemigewasset River. A short hike brought them to the riverbank, where they
said they saw the Lincoln Woods Trail on the far shore and decided to cross
the river. This wetted the pair some. Turning north on the trail, they went on,
crossed another brook, and got a little wetter. That led them to turn around,
and as they started back, they noticed a group of hikers emerging from the
Franconia Falls Trail. Omar and Chris had seen these hikers back at the parking lot and then reasoned that the Franconia Falls Trail would set them back
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on a loop. But, when they reached the falls, they found the trail ended; dark
fell soon after. It brought with it temperatures dropping into the teens.
The night was, as November nights are, a long one. The pair grew colder,
and Chris, fearing they wouldn’t get up if they went to sleep, kept them moving, even as they had lost the trail in the darkness. At some point, they came
upon a small stream, crossed it, got wet again, and began to follow the stream
downhill. The stream brought them to the river. At first light, reasoning that
they had begun on that far side, they crossed the river. During the crossing,
Omar fell and struck his head. As the pair made their way down the east side,
Omar fell again. At this point (9 a.m.), they decided Chris should go for the
help that became finally the flight to Dartmouth-Hitchcock.
CO McKee learned that neither man had ever hiked in the Whites, and
that they thought they’d simply go for a walk in the woods. That the woods
were named Lincoln and centered on a named river, too, escaped them, as did
the need to carry any equipment or supplies with them. After all, what do you
need to carry for a walk in the woods?
—S.S.

Running on Empty
Early on the afternoon of January 23, 2021, NHFG Lt. Kneeland got notice of
a 911 call. Coordinates from the call placed the caller a quarter-mile off-trail in
the Lafayette Brook drainage. When Kneeland called back, he heard the voice
of a panicked man, desperate for rescue. The voice belonged to Michael B.,
age 35; somewhere in the vicinity and in similar need was Nicholas D., age 34.
At 9 a.m. the two men had left the Lafayette Place parking lot to speed hike
the Franconia loop, going up Falling Waters Trail to Franconia Ridge Trail,
intending to then hike from the summit of Mount Lafayette down Greenleaf Trail and Old Bridle Path. They figured on a four-hour circuit and, as is
often true of those trying to move at speed, they were traveling light. Around
10:30 a.m., the pair paused to add a layer for the cold, exposed terrain ahead;
then they climbed the final yards in the open to Little Haystack Mountain.
Even as they did this, they felt overheated from their rapid ascent. Crossing the
open ridgeline took them about an hour. Atop Lafayette, Michael and Nicholas located the sign pointing to the Greenleaf Trail down to Greenleaf Hut.
Then the wind ramped up, filling the air with blown snow, obscuring the way.
Unsure of the trail, the pair followed some partially filled tracks, but those
prints proved a dead end. They returned to the summit and tried again with
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another set of tracks; those too went nowhere. At this point, the heavy wind
discouraged them from trying to retrace their steps, and they felt the urgency
of needing to find shelter, so they resolved to bushwhack down toward
treeline.
This unscripted descent brought them into waist-deep snow, and beneath
that snow the scrub of alpine spruce, which began to claw at their feet.
Quickly, Nicholas lost first one, then his second shoe; branches also stripped
off one of Michael’s microspikes. Michael later reported to NHFG Sgt. Heidi
Murphy that they’d gone “into full panic mode.”
First, they tried their phones, but both were frozen and inoperable. Continuing their hurried descent, they came to an apparent opening in the brush
and aimed down it. That made walking easier, but when their feet dropped
through the snow, they got wet. The pair was at the upper end of a brook
drainage. Michael began to cramp; Nicholas kept on; they got separated.
Michael worked to thaw his phone, finally succeeding in placing the initial 911 call. Then, via yelling he relocated Nicholas, and the pair resolved to
stay together. Michael then tried unsuccessfully to rewarm Nicholas’s feet,
and, as reported to Lt. Kneeland over the phone, he worried that Nicholas was beginning to “slip away.” Michael later estimated that the pair had
stopped their descent around 12:45 p.m.
Kneeland plotted the pair’s position at around 3,200 feet above sea level
in the Lafayette Brook drainage, a quarter-mile from the Greenleaf Trail. His
short exchanges with Michael convinced Kneeland that he needed to try for
a helicopter rescue, even as the Pemigewasset Valley Search and Rescue Team
was already mustering volunteers to go up on foot. New Hampshire’s Army
National Guard scrambled a crew together, and at 2:35 p.m. the Black Hawk
helicopter lifted off from Concord. Kneeland had provided them with coordinates and an approach from the north up the Lafayette drainage to keep
the copter below the cloud deck and roiled weather up high. At 3:08 p.m., the
helicopter crew spotted Michael and Nicholas, lowered a medic to them, and,
over the next minutes raised each man back up. At 3:38 p.m. the helicopter
flew off to Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical Center, and Kneeland was able to
call down the ground rescuers on the Greenleaf Trail.
Comment: There’s a lot afoot, or off it, in this incident. With trail runners
and speed-hikers (the two categories overlap heavily, as runners will tell you
that on long uphills they are almost always hiking), fitness is rarely an issue.
Armored thusly, runners sometimes incline toward overcommitment, even
on days when other factors may suggest caution. January 23 was such a day,
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with an average temperature of –8 degrees Fahrenheit and winds averaging 60
mph on nearby Mount Washington; within the cloud deck that fogged the
ridgetop, those winds would also stir and restir the two inches of new snow
that had fallen on the 22nd.
Michael was the pair’s leader, having completed the demanding 8.9-mile
loop several times, though all but one circuit he had walked or run with no
snow underfoot. Nicholas was on new ground. They’d checked the AllTrails
app, which opined that microspikes on their running shoes would suffice,
and they’d looked at the weather, where they’d seen no reason to worry. Aside
from some food, liquid, and clothing layers to manage the heat of exertion,
Michael and Nicholas carried little with them. In this gear-heavy season, they
were going light. At times, such a decision can seem to offer an advantage:
The thinking is that a lighter load equals more speed and less time exposed
along the ridgeline, but that is flawed reasoning.
All the trouble that ensued was rooted in the pair’s preparations, which
amounted to a thin margin of safety. Going “fast and light” depends on “fast.”
When limited vision and trail-finding troubles slowed them, Michael and
Nicholas felt their thin margin vanishing. That feeling urged them to go fast
again. As Michael said, they’d gone “into full panic mode,” leading them into
the drainage that stripped, soaked, and, finally, stopped them.
What about maintaining poise under duress? Not long ago, during an
interview with a Mountain Rescue Service climber, I asked how he and his
fellow climbers kept their composure in hard conditions. “So,” said Steve
Larson, “on MRS rescues you have climbers who have been up the world’s
biggest mountains and in the worst conditions. And most of us have been
doing it for so long that, even when it’s terrible conditions, we are comfortable.” That comfort allows these rescuers to assess the terrain and the day and
make good decisions. Because most of us lack that sort of experience, it’s better to err on the lower risk side of adventures that may bring us into terrible
conditions. Lt. Kneeland recommended Michael and Nicholas be billed for
this rescue’s costs.*

* New Hampshire is one of a handful of states with a law allowing authorities to bill hikers
for the cost of their rescues, if their actions are found to be negligent. See Kelleigh Welch’s
story, “Who Pays for Search and Rescue? Behind the Tricky Economics of New Hampshire
SAR,” on outdoors.org, February 27, 2020: outdoors.org/resources/amc-outdoors/features
/who-pays-for-search-and-rescue-behind-the-tricky-economics-of-new-hampshire-sar/
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Coda: The speed with which this rescue took place—just about three hours
from call to copter haul-up—impresses . . . and cautions. Even had the helicopter been unable to find or lift the pair, PVSART was nearing the spot on foot.
But, rescuers remind us, it is much wiser to be prepared for an extended wait.
—S.S.

Making the Call
On the same day, January 23, not far east of the helicopter drama just outlined, two brothers, Dirke B., age 39, and Eric B., age 45, set out to climb
Mount Adams via the Valley Way and Star Lake Trail. Their plan included
an assessment pause at Madison Spring Hut, where they’d decide if Mount
Adams looked feasible. It did, and they went up. On the way down in the
afternoon, the wind rose, stirring up the loose snow mentioned in the previous incident; the brothers lost the trail, and, following the inclination of
most lost hikers, headed downhill. This brought them into deep loose snow
at the head of Madison Gulf. They reoriented themselves using their map
and started back up toward Star Lake and the hut. While floundering, Dirke
broke a snowshoe and felt a “pop,” then pain, in his upper leg. The pain in
his leg and the deep snow slowed then stopped Dirke. The brothers conferred
and sent out a general text asking for help.
Just before 4 p.m. NHFG’s Lt. Mark Ober received notice from 911,
including the callers’ coordinates, but he was unable to make return contact.
Ober was able to reach a family member who had received the text, and she
gave him a sense of the hikers’ capabilities and her sense that they would only
call for help in an emergency. Ober began to muster a rescue crew. He was
also able to plot the brothers’ location, finding them off-trail to the east of the
Buttress Trail. He sent a text directing them to try to climb back toward Star
Lake; they texted back that they were trying. The temperature was near zero
and the winds gusted near 70 mph.
Ober reached the Appalachia parking lot on Route 2 at around 5 p.m. to
await the rescuers, and around 5:30 he got a text from the brothers saying that
they’d reached the hut. Ober was then able to get a call through to them and
learn that upon reaching the hut and the packed-out Valley Way, the brothers
felt they could get down on their own. Ober called off the rescuers and waited
for the brothers, who reached the lot around 7:30 p.m.
Comment: This incident asks us to imagine when we might make a
call for help. Answers will vary, of course, as people and days do, but some
Winter/Spring 2022 109

common considerations emerge. Perhaps devising a short list of questions in
advance can offer a way to deal with the first moments when calling for help
seems an option.
• Where am I?
• What’s my primary problem?
• What, after a pause to think, do I need to address my problem?
• What am I (we) carrying that can help me?
• Who has what I need?
• How equipped am I to wait?
These questions assume a clear mind, free of panic’s and hypothermia’s
effects. Panic is an intensifier—pain feels stronger, weather more ominous,
light in short supply. Cold can skew all planning, especially as one of hypothermia’s onset signs is confusion and flawed reasoning.
Ober’s incident analysis found that the brothers had responded well to
their dilemma: They had discovered their descent error by checking their
map; after Dirke’s injury and their call, they had resumed trying to get back
on track; once they had reached firmer ground, they had gotten down and
out. These questions illuminate a significant omission in their planning, however. Though they were well equipped for their walking, the brothers were not
equipped to wait in the cold and wind. The incident described next points
to the gear that the most experienced winter hikers see as routine, even as it
usually makes for a pack weighing over 30 pounds.
—S.S.

Slipping
Saturday, March 6, broke clear and cold; winds up high were modest. It was,
in short, a superb day to go out and up. How good that must have felt for
Rob Z., age 69, Katie B., age 38, and Eric R., age 37, who had planned a long
and ambitious traverse of the Tripyramids, Mount Whiteface, and Mount
Passaconaway. The trio are experienced winter hikers and four-season Appalachian Mountain Club trip leaders for whom White Mountain trails are
preferred ground.
A little after 11 a.m., they had reached the top of the long slide that falls
down the side of South Tripyramid. To reach the Kate Sleeper Trail, the trio
needed to cross the slide, dropping around 100 feet. All three were wearing
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clawed snowshoes that had been perfect for climbing the day’s soft snow with
some crust. Rob was in the lead, and he paused to look at the snow atop the
slide; it looked firm, and he stepped out. A few steps showed him a very different surface, and he warned the others to stop. The slide was hard ice, likely
the result of some recent rain and the slide’s southern exposure to the sun.
As Rob began to turn around gingerly, he slipped. “It was as though he just
disappeared,” Katie recalled. “It happened so fast.”
Rob recalled the moment this way:
The surface on the slide looked like packed snow. I took several steps out
before realizing it was like pond ice, probably from its south-facing melt–
freeze cycles. Katie was a bit behind me and I told her to stop! I turned my
head to look at her and she was crouching down and saying, “I am trying to
get an edge in.” Snowshoe crampons aren’t sharp, as I tried to turn, I heard
them grind on the ice surface and then I was on my way down, I think I was
in a crouching position facing forward. Looking down 800 feet, I was flying
down the ice, all I could think was I have to stop. It happened so fast; the
acceleration was boggling.

Katie and Eric called out to Rob, finally getting an answer; they set out
about putting on crampons and working their way across the slope to reach
the far side where they thought they could descend more safely. During his
slide, Rob had broken through the crust in spots and hit his left foot on
something within the snow. He stopped at the same level as the Sleeper Trail’s
entrance. He couldn’t stand on his left leg, so he crawled across the slide to
the trail, where Katie and Eric soon arrived to meet him.
Thanks to their generous sharing, I have accounts of the day from all three
hikers, and it’s clear to me that their leadership training kicked in immediately. Rob remembered, “I thought, I am OK enough—no helicopter rides
today, and I am not going down this slide in a sled if I can help it—but
we are going to need help. We got out the map and assessed our position.”
Descent of the slide was the only option, and Rob felt that, with Katie and
Eric’s assistance, he could butt-slide that. He would depend on his partners’
breaking a path into softer snow with their crampons; he would use his ice
axe for control. Once down and on less slanted ground, the trio knew they’d
need to wait for help.
With a clear signal at this height, they agreed that Eric would phone for
rescue. Patched through to NHFG, Eric reviewed their plan to descend the
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slide, and Lt. James Kneeland agreed with it and set about arranging to have
rescuers meet them at the base of the slide. At 12:35 p.m. they set out down
the slide, with Katie and Eric breaking trail and Rob working his way through
the broken snow and crust. His stiff winter boot helped to minimize the pain,
and his ice axe added to his sense of control. They reached the slide’s base at
around 2 p.m. The temperature was in the mid-teens with a light breeze.
There, they broke out their thermal pads and two sleeping bags, food and
water, donned added clothing, and waited for the rescuers. They decided that
Eric would snowshoe out along the Livermore Trail to meet the rescuers,
while Katie would wait with Rob. Katie recalled:
Eric would text when he met up with the rescuers. It took some time, but not
nearly as long as I would have thought, for Eric to send that text. I moved
around, both to stay warm and to get things as organized as possible. The
first three rescuers arrived before sunset. They did a thorough examination,
and when more rescuers arrived they packed Rob into a litter, and we started
down. When we reached Livermore, we found a snowcat waiting, and it was
able to take all of us down the fire road—saving us miles and hours.

Rob Z. waits inside a bivouac sack for rescuers after sliding on thick ice on the South
Tripyramid slide. COURTESY OF THE CLIMBERS
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Comment: The competence of everyone involved in this incident is evident
in the preceding description. After a serious accident—Rob both fractured
and dislocated his ankle—the trio assessed the situation, made a clear plan,
called for help, and provided a sure sense of where they were and what they
planned to do; then they set about following that plan. All three point to their
training as AMC trip leaders as central to their response. That Rob had been
one of Eric’s and Katie’s trainers must have offered some solace to him, even
as he knew this was no simple injury that could be sloughed off in a few days.
It just seems right that Rob, Eric, and Katie should make the summary
comments on this incident.
Eric: “First off, Rob is one among the many AMC leaders that have taught
me so much about preparedness in the White Mountains. The lesson that
came to fruition this day was to be prepared to spend/survive a night out in
the event something goes wrong. I always find it interesting that invariably,
on every winter hike, some passing hiker comments on the size of my pack
and asks, ‘Spending the night?’”
Katie: “My biggest takeaway is the importance of efficient assessment and
decision-making. Take Wilderness First Aid, and keep it current. Take leadership refresher courses. I’m still impressed by Rob’s self-awareness and ability
to self-rescue over to the junction from the site of the fall. Rob knew he
couldn’t bear weight, and he knew the consequences of waiting to make the
call. His quick decisions at the junction helped maximize the daylight and
allowed for a safe and efficient rescue.
“Rob is a good friend, mentor, and hiking companion. Over the years, he’s
taught me map-and-compass skills, leadership skills, preparedness, etc. I trust
and respect his experience and decision-making, and I am convinced that’s
what led to a successful rescue.”
Rob: “I always carry enough equipment to survive the night, and my
InReach provides my position every 20 minutes to the Garmin Explore website so I can always be found. My summer day pack weighs about 15 pounds,
my winter day pack about 30 to 35 pounds. Hikers I meet on the trail often
see my big pack and ask me where I camped. Sometimes, I pause and get into
a discussion about light and fast versus heavy and safe. Dying of exposure in
the Whites shouldn’t happen with proper preparation and equipment. My
mistakes: I was tired (I hadn’t slept well for several nights), I misjudged the
surface and did not mitigate the possible risk of sliding hundreds of feet. I
trusted the crampons on my snowshoes to hold on the slide, but they are not
made for ice. Look, think, act.”
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Rob again, in a later email: “I just wanted to supplement what I have
said by saying how important it was that I had Katie and Eric with me. I have
hiked a fair amount with them and trust their abilities and decision-making.
They helped make me comfortable on the slide and gave me feedback assessing my condition. We worked as a team planning my rescue with Fish and
Game, getting down the slide, and making me comfortable when we reached
the bottom. Can’t say enough.”
Rob projects his return to trails in September. We wish him that return
and good walking.
—S.S.

General Thoughts on Skiing in the Winter of 2020–2021
The winter of 2020–2021 brought a new kind of uncertainty to the Northeastern backcountry ski community. Beginning the previous spring, the new
coronavirus pandemic had driven a fresh cohort of skiers to start “earning their
turns,” skinning uphill under their own power before descending ungroomed,
wild snow. Throngs of less-experienced backcountry skiers emerging from
ski shops clutching touring boots, lightweight skis, and mohair skins joined
the ranks of condition-chasing Northeastern veterans. Many half-time ski
tourers abandoned their ski-resort lift passes for reasons of social distancing.
The more experienced backcountry travelers in and around the Mount Washington Valley braced for more significant crowding in their favorite spots,
both below and above treeline. Pessimists also discussed the likelihood of
greater risk-taking among the uninitiated, especially those who had little or
no experience in avalanche terrain and had taken no formal avalanche training courses.
At times, the pessimists were justified in worrying. Consider, for example,
an avalanche involvement in Tuckerman Ravine from January 22, in which
one skier in a party of two was fully buried by a small slab avalanche while skiing in Left Gully during a storm. As reported by Frank Carus on the Mount
Washington Avalanche Center (MWAC) Instagram page, he had met the pair
earlier that day:
I suggested to these two skiers, who did not have beacons, shovels or probes,
that they ski the lower-angled slope[s] . . . if they skied anything at all. They
later told me that the excitement of new snow drove them to the top [of Left
Gully] and into the upper start zone where the incident then unfolded.
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At the top of Left Gully, the second skier had triggered an avalanche on
top of his companion, then skied away to the base of the ravine, unaware that
the partner had been buried. Fortunately, he did eventually realize his companion’s plight and summoned other skiers from the base of the ravine who
found his lost partner. This kind of incident, involving neophytes in the backcountry operating with little knowledge in suspect conditions, is exactly the
sort of scenario that those concerned with backcountry overcrowding often
mention in discussing their worries. The neophytes involved in the January
22 accident survived to tell the tale and educate fellow users. But as you will
read in the next section, a far more experienced ski mountaineer was not so
lucky. As is often said in avalanche courses: The mountains don’t care how
much experience you have.
We are lucky, in the Northeast, to have such easy access to the breathtaking high-alpine terrain of the Presidential Range; for skiers, it is an unparalleled resource. Lucky, too, that we have a long history of alpine mentorship
that we can draw on in a time of rapid growth for backcountry skiing, not to
mention four-season backcountry recreation of all kinds. The final blessing,
for all of us who spend time on Mount Washington in winter, is the hard
work and dedication of the MWAC snow rangers, who issue daily avalanche
forecasts and bulletins and—as is made clear in the January 22 incident—are
fully committed to education and outreach for all.
—Scott Berkley
Assistant Accidents Editor

Solo
The morning of Monday, February 1, was a brief window of calm before a
storm. With inverted weather bringing negative temperatures to the Mount
Washington Valley and sun, light winds, and calm skies in the alpine zone
above the cloud band, Monday was an opportunity to go above treeline before
a winter storm would bring heavy snow and high winds that night. Following
that snow and wind, avalanche danger would rise, and moving safely in the
alpine zone would become more difficult.
Ian F., age 54, might have glimpsed the Presidentials above the cloud
band as he drove over from his home in Lincoln, Vermont. A self-established
legend in New England’s human-powered ski community, Ian was known
for his irrepressible desire to ski the best snow around his home stomping
grounds of central Vermont. He also made frequent trips to the Presidential
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Range to climb and ski the steep chute and gully lines that populate its flanks.
On February 1, he went to ski in New Hampshire by himself, parking at
the base of the summer hiking trail that ascends Ammonoosuc Ravine and
climbing swiftly to treeline. With an early start and good fitness, Ian was on
the summit cone of Mount Washington by 11 a.m., according to cell phone
records later collected by search-and-rescue agencies.
Once up high, Ian had a choice, per his text message to a friend the previous day: whether to traverse south and ski down the snow-covered streambed
of Monroe Brook from the top of Mount Monroe, or to descend directly into
Ammonoosuc Ravine, following one of the multiple skiable gullies from the
west side of the summit cone down toward the confluence below. “Might
ski Monroe Brook depending on how the Ammo looks,” he had written,
suggesting that the Ammonoosuc, steep and pinched off at points, was the
desired descent, and Monroe a backup. It’s not clear, following the MWAC’s
investigation (source for this write-up), if he had also scouted the entrance of
Monroe Brook. In the late morning, Ian was making his first turns into the
Ammonoosuc.
By the end of the day Tuesday—following an overnight 24-inch salvo
from the winter storm—Ian’s friends in Vermont had not heard from him
in more than 24 hours, and they notified NHFG of his absence. The search
began on Tuesday. NHFG officers checked for Ian’s car at trailheads on both
the well-traveled east side of the range and the lesser-traveled west side.
COs located his car on Wednesday morning, and in coordination with the
MWAC snow rangers and local search-and-rescue organizations, they began
to search a variety of skiable descents in the broader Ammonoosuc drainage,
dispatching teams to Monroe Brook (Ian’s backup descending route) and the
Ammonoosuc Ravine summer trail (his route of ascent), as well as the upper
Ammonoosuc.
As the search progressed on Tuesday, investigators used cell phone records
and GPS triangulation to track Ian’s movements to the upper-central section
of Ammonoosuc Ravine. Searchers focused their efforts closer to the primary
ski line coming off of the summit cone. At 4:25 p.m., a search team member
using an avalanche transceiver picked up a signal in a choked-off section at
4,000 feet of elevation. Other searchers converged there and used avalanche
probes to penetrate the snow, trying to “strike” the victim buried beneath the
debris. With a dozen feet of snow accumulated against a rock outcrop, however, they were forced to dig partially into the debris pile before they could
confirm, by probing, that there was indeed a body buried beneath.
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Rescuers use a probe to search deep snow for Ian F.’s body in Ammonoosuc Ravine, below
Mount Washington. MOUNT WASHINGTON AVALANCHE CENTER

As reported by MWAC lead snow ranger Frank Carus, extricating Ian’s
body from the depths of accumulated snow required the full cohort of eight
searchers, who dug with foldable avalanche shovels for over 90 minutes
before reaching the victim. Searchers shoveled what must have been, by a
conservative estimate, 11,000 pounds of snow. Then they began the complex
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process of belaying Ian’s body down the technical upper stretches of the gully.
From there, the team used a plastic sled to move him across the ravine to the
Ammonoosuc Ravine summer trail and out to the trailhead.
What had happened in the intervening minutes between Ian’s first turns
into Ammonoosuc Ravine and the snow burial that took his life? As assessed
by Carus, Ian must have skied into an isolated patch of dense, reactive snow
blown together by high wind—known in avalanche parlance as a wind slab—
that was hidden among the firm, icy bed surface snow that made the skiing
difficult, but, also for the most part, stable and predictable. The wind slab
would have swept him down the steep gully and carried him into a “terrain
trap” that collected the shallow snow into a deeper burial. Carus writes, “It
is likely that [Ian] triggered one of these pockets and was carried into the
bowl-like depression, where the snow was stopped by an overhanging cliff
that was angled upslope.” This, the “first avalanche,” as it was called in the
MWAC report, would have caused Ian’s death, ruled by medical examiners as asphyxia (suffocation) from burial under the snow. A “second avalanche,” triggered naturally from the quantity of falling snow on Monday
night and Tuesday, had doubly covered the terrain trap where his body had
come to rest.
Comment: Mount Washington is a mountain of two sides, especially for
skiers. Hordes of fair-weather backcountry skiers make the pilgrimage to ski
Tuckerman Ravine—“Tucks”— and the east side in the spring months, but
an increasing group of more conditions-tolerant ski mountaineers descend
the outlying ravines and gullies, many of which lie on the west side. Ian was
unquestionably from the latter camp. Having spent many years skiing the
difficult, variable conditions of Vermont’s backcountry, Ian likely found the
snow surface in the Ammonoosuc on February 1 challenging, but not deterring. The MWAC report noted, “Prior photos of the Ammonoosuc terrain
show expanses of ice cliffs and icy rock slabs, all of which break up expanses
of snow, leaving isolated areas of bed surface”—in short, a bulletproof, icy
snow layer.
Scratching down icy snow and dodging exposed rocks would not have
been grade-A skiing, but Ian was known to appreciate a ski descent no matter
the conditions. The MWAC avalanche forecast, published early that morning, suggests what a skier or snowboarder might have expected in the alpine
zone on that Monday: “Low avalanche danger exists throughout the forecast
area, though the potential for small avalanches of wind-drifted snow remains
in isolated areas at mid and upper elevations.” Ian chose to go up high and
118 Appalachia

ski a challenging route on a day when the snow conditions and the odds of
safe travel favored him. Carus, in his assessment of the fatality, speaks less of
the dangers inherent in the snow that Ian skied, and more to the question
of his solitary skiing:
Even the most experienced skiers with all the correct preparations and equipment risk more when skiing alone. Even small avalanches can be deadly, especially over a terrain trap. . . . Skiing technical lines, in a thin snowpack above
a notorious terrain trap, with no partners, even on a low-danger day, raises the
stakes tremendously.

Solo skiing is hazardous in a way that solo hiking, for example, is not:
The very core of every skier’s self-rescue system is a partner or partners who,
adequately equipped with avalanche transceivers and rescue equipment, can
extract them from an avalanche burial.
Not all avalanche burials are created equal, however. Despite what MWAC
concluded was a relatively small initial avalanche, Ian was buried as the snow
funneled up against a rocky terrain trap and collected around him. Skiers are
taught to scan for terrain traps both before and as they descend, but they are
often difficult to sense in advance. The sheer volume of snow that collects
during a slide and then sets up to the consistency of concrete in the minutes
afterward is a challenge to even the best-trained and most prepared rescuers aiming to extricate an avalanche victim.
How we assess Ian’s decision to ski alone on February 1 says a lot about
who we are and how we approach the mountains. Much of the deluge of
negative, internet-based commentary on solo skiing in the wake of the fatality was, to say the least, insensitive. Often those comments were “a useless
exercise in hypothetically infallible self-endorsement,” as the Wyoming skier
and writer Cy Whitling put it.
If anything, we skiers would do best to use Ian’s passing as a moment
of reflection, to ask ourselves how we can move through the mountains,
in their variable winter moods and moments, more safely and thoughtfully. This takes close scrutiny of one’s own human factors, biases, and blind
spots. Says Whitling, “There’s an opportunity for growth here, but only if
you enter it with a growth mindset.” We—skiers, White Mountain lovers,
humans—stand to gain much more by looking to Ian’s story with humility
and open-mindedness.
—S.B.
Winter/Spring 2022 119

Cold Story
Sunday, March 14, showed no sign that spring neared. Mount Washington’s
Observatory recorded an average temperature of –5, 17 degrees below the
norm, with winds ranging from 60 to 100 mph from the north; 5 inches of
snow fell, or more accurately rode the winds in curtains and swirls. Early
that morning, Roy S., age 66, set out up the Glencliff Trail to climb Mount
Moosilauke. Retired and relatively new to winter hiking, Roy had developed
a fondness for its sharp air and snows.
At around 8 p.m. NHFG Sgt. Heidi Murphy got a call from New Hampshire State Police, who had received worried calls from Roy’s wife and son.
Roy hadn’t returned to Massachusetts from his hike as planned. State Police
had checked the lot at the trailhead and found Roy’s car still there. Sgt. Murphy called both relatives, who said that Roy did own winter gear and had a
good deal of mountain experience; neither was sure of his exact route, but his
son thought he had headed up the Glencliff Trail to Moosilauke’s summit and
planned to return the same way. Neither knew if Roy was carrying a sleeping
bag or shelter.
Sgt. Murphy summoned two NHFG COs to start a hasty search; at 11 p.m.
COs James A. Cyrs and Christopher G. McKee started up the Glencliff Trail,
and Sgt. Murphy then drove to trailheads at Breezy Point and the Moosilauke
Ravine Lodge to see if Roy might have emerged at either. The two COs were
turned back by high winds, cold, and blowing snow at 4,200 feet without seeing any sign of Roy; they reached the trailhead just after 3 a.m. After checking
trailheads again, Sgt. Murphy drove into town, and, at 4:40 a.m., she called
Lt. James Kneeland to organize the search for the 15th.
A full-scale search began that morning, with groups of volunteers from
PVSART and MRS joining NHFG COs in covering possible trails and drainages; NHFG also requested a NHANG helicopter, which was promised for
10:30 a.m. The skies had cleared, and the cold had intensified, with the day’s
average temperature atop Mount Washington reading –17 degrees, 29 degrees
below normal. The search ground on until midafternoon, when searchers
from NHANG and NHFG found tracks heading down the Gorge Brook
drainage. Those tracks led finally to Roy, who appeared frozen. Rescuers lifted
him to the helicopter, which flew then to Dartmouth-Hitchcock Medical
Center, where Roy was declared dead.
Comment: Although a day of blowing snow and deepening cold doesn’t
recommend itself as a day to go above treeline, Roy’s chosen route on Moosilauke would provide some shelter on the way to the ridgetop. The bulk of the
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mountain would rise as partial shield from the north wind, and up high the
thick spruce would offer pockets of relative calm. Still, though Roy had read
a forecast, the difference between weather near the mountain’s base and above
the trees would be extreme . . . and growing more so as the day went on.
A phone call to NHFG’s Lt. Kneeland on the 16th offered a little more
detail about Roy’s route on the 14th. Two hikers had begun not long after Roy
at around 8 a.m.; they had passed Roy partway up the trail, and then, a little
after 10:30 a.m., the pair had met Roy again at treeline as they retreated from
their climb. The two hikers had gone a short distance above treeline, and then
deemed the weather too extreme to keep on. At that point, the pair spoke
with Roy for five to ten minutes and advised against going higher, especially
as he already looked cold. Roy said he would turn back if it got too bad.
How Roy got to Gorge Brook from that meeting atop the ridge between
Moosilauke and its south peak remains a mystery. A few factors offer suggestion: The Gorge Brook drainage lies to the right of the trail along the ridge,
and from the summit, it lies south, or downwind, with the Gorge Brook
Trail skirting along the drainage rim. The day’s very strong winds would urge
a walker in the drainage’s direction, and, as cold and wind took their toll it
would be the path of least resistance.
Roy’s cause of death was officially listed as “environmental hypothermia.”
The medical examiner estimated that he died on the 14th. An inventory of
Roy’s clothing and backpack pointed to a reasonable assemblage of threeseason gear, but the absence of a sleeping bag and some form of shelter was
inadequate for winter. That these two days were extreme winter intensified
the problem. Also, amid his various layers Roy carried and wore jeans as basic
legwear. Cotton’s a problem in cold.
Turning back is its own art form. It takes experience, sensitivity, and imagination to conjure it in time, especially when it concerns cold, which often
works on and against the very seat of sensibility.
—S.S.
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